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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------STATE OF UTAH,
Plointiff/Respondent,

..

vs.

Case No. 18,337

THOMAS P. DYER,
Defendont/Appellant.

----------------------BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The State of Utah filed

an

Information charging the

defendant with murder in the second degree, a felony of the first
degree, in violation of Section 76-5-203,
c:mended.

Subsequent thereto,

Information

charging

the State of Utah amended the
defendant

the

Utah Criminal Code, as

with

manslaughter, a felony of the second degree,

the

crime

of

in violation of

Section 76-5-205, Utah Criminal Code, as amended.
The charging part of the amended Inform2tion accused the
defendant as follows:
"[That] THOMAS PETERSON DYER did recklessly c2use the
death of Nina Marie Fuellemc:n."
DISPOS~T:ON

I~

-

THE
LOWER
- - - COURT

The case was tried in the Fourth Judicial District Court in
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and for Utah County, State of Utah, sitting in Provo, Utah, on
March 3 and 4, 1982, with the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge,
presiding.
The case was heard without
Waiver of a Jury Trial.
finding

that

he

could

Judge
not

jury pursuant to defendant's

a

Bullock rendered

find

the

defendant

manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.

a

judgment

guilty of

After a subsequent

hearing Judge Bullock found the defendant guilty of negligent
homicide.
The defendant was sentenced to a term of one year in the
Utah County Jail and to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the late evening of August 21, 1981, defendant, in the
company of his brother, Rob, and the victim, went to a tavern
known as the Forrest Inn,
beverages.

where all

partook of 2lcoholic

All three left the Forrest Inn at approximately 1:30

o'clock a.m. (August 22,

1981) and arrived at the residence of

defendant and Rob at about 2:00 a.m.

Defendant and Rob were

arguing as they arrived at their residence.

Victim went upstairs

to the second floor and defendant and Rob pursued the argument on
the

first

floor.

The

argument culminated

when

Rob

struck

defendant several times, knocked him down, and began choking
defendant.

Defendant never struck back,

the fight.

and was passive during

The argument was over prior to the time that the

rifle was discharged. (R. 308, Line 30, 309,

Lines 1-5)

During the argument the victim was upstairs on the second
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floor, and the defend2nt and Rob were on the first floor.
Rob let defendant up,

and defendant went to the bedroom

wher€ he obtained a .30-.30 caliber lever action rifle.

testified that

he

never did see defendant use the gun after Rob had used it

CR.

used the rifle last

(R.

305,

Line 4).

Rob

Rob had

305, Lines 9-10).
The first recollection that Rob testified to was that he saw
the gun exploding CR. 294, Line 2).

Rob's testimony was that at

no time was the gun pointed in his direction (R. 294,
307, Lines 14-16; 312, Line 22).

Rob testified that the rifle

was pointed down and not in his direction (R.
testified that the gun

Line 15;

was never at

294,

line 19),

Rob

any time used by the

defendant to threaten Rob (R. 307, lines 10-15; 310, lines 5-9).
Rob testified that the defendant did not draw the gun with the
intention of shooting (R. 307 7 lines 5-13).

The State did not

produce any evidence showing that the defendant loaded the gun or

knew that the gun was loaded.
charged CR. 300,

The gun was accidentally dis-

Line 28; 308, Lines 6-9), causing the death of

\

the victim who, unknown to both defend2nt and Rob, had walked
from the second floor to the fir st floor.
ARGUME~~T

The Points in appellant's argument are intended to present
to the Court legal premises in an order which, if accepted by the
Court as a basis for reversal, would preclude consideratiorl of
subsequent points.
PO I :JT I
TH:: TRIAL CCURT IS ,,-{ITHCUT AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER A LESSER

A:l D I :; C L UDE D 0 F F E NS E I N V I E·.~ CF I T S F I tJ DI

:~

G 0 F N0 T G UI L T Y AS T O
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THE CHARGE OF MANSLAUGHTER.
(A)

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States of America provides,
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... ".
At the conclusion of argument by counsel,
essence,

rendered

a verdict of not

guilty

to

the Court,
the

in

charge of

manslaughter:
"THE COURT:
Okay.
I am convinced -- well, let's put
it another way: that the evidence is not convincing that the
defendant intentionally pulled the trigger on the rifle.
I'd have to find that, I think, in order to find this man
guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and
I can't do that.
However, I agree with what you say with
respect to the negligence involved in bringing a loaded,
taking a 102ded rifle under the circumstances, being intoxicated, having it on his lap, having it in a condition that
it can be discharged accidentally with people around, and I
believe that that is negligent homicide under Section
76-5-206. However, I'm not going to pass sentence--strike
that.
I'm not going to find that he's guilty of that
offense this afternoon.
I'm going to give you an opportunity to brief the law on that matter, and you can come
back here tomorrow morning."
(R. 355, lines 7-22)
Neither plaintiff nor defendant requested a lesser included
offense.
(B)

The

State

unilaterally

amended

the

charge

to

manslaughter.
Defense counsel,
determined

on

the other

hand,

based upon what he

was in the best interests of defendant,

took the

strategic position that the evidence would not sustain a conviction of manslaughter.
The trial court held that the evidence was not sufficient to
support a conviction of manslaughter.
into

the

prosecutori2l

case

when

The trial judge entered

strategy of the Cose by reevaluating the

he determined that the charge

should
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have been

negligent homicide.

The strategy of the defense,

all or nothing approach,

was also violated.

having been 2n
It needs

to be

accepted at this point that a cardinal rule of trial practice
regarding the three principal participants (the judge, and the
two opposing lawyers) is that (1) the judge will not act in any
manner which will influence the outcome of the trial; and (2) the
opposing lawyers are entitled to their strategy in dealing with
their ca·se.
He challenged

In the present case, the judge modified the rules.
and defeated the competency of the prosecutor;

he

in essence told the prosecutor that his evaluation of the case

was wrong.

The Judge, by his actions, deprived the defense

attorney of conducting that strategy which,

in his judgment,

was

in the best interest of his client.
(C)

The State of Utah has previously taken a position

that is consistent with and supports the position urged by the
defendant in this case.
In

State v.

Bagge~~

(Case No.

16232),

the State of Utah

argwec:
" ... the appellant did not establish any basis upon
which he could be convicted of the lesser offense because he
desired an acquittal based on an all or nothing theory of
the defense.
In State~ Mor_§., 588 P.2d 1335 (Utah, 1977)
this Court distinguished situations similar to this one and
stated that lesser included offense instructions were not
2bsolutely necessary where the appellant was attempting an
all or nothing theory of defense." (Page 4)
" ... The apellant was informed of his options by his
counsel and decided to attempt to gain 2n acquittal by
proceeding on an all or nothing defense theory ... ". (Page 56)

POINT II
~~

E GL I GE NT

H0 MI C I DE

IS

N0 T A LE S S E R I ~~ C L UDE D 0 F F E NS E
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oF

MANSLAUGHTER.
From

a

statutory

point

of

view,

the

Code

does

not

specifically provide that negligent homicide is a lesser included
offense of manslaughter.

Section 76-2-101,

Utah Code Annotated,

defines the "requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility" as follows:
"No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct
is prohibited by law and:
(1)
He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly
or with criminal negligence with respect to each
element of the offense as the definition of the offense
requires; or
(2)
His acts
strict liability."

constitute

an

offense

involving

The states of mind that will sustain a conviction are set
forth disjunctively as "intentionally,
with criminal negligence".

knowingly,

recklessly or

The issue is whether the mental state

sufficient to establish criminal negligence

is

a lesser

and

included

position of

the

aspect

of

recklessly.

It

is

the

defendant that it is not.
In

view

manslaughter
reckless

of the
may

conduct,

be

fact

that

convictions on

obtained

on

proof of

[Section 76-2-206

(b)

the

facts

and

(c)],

charge of
other

than

negligent

homicide cc.nnot be deemed a lesser and included offense thereof.
The

statutory language defining "recklessly"

and "with criminal

negligence" [Section 76-2-103 (3) and (4), Utah Code Annotated]
are similar with the following exceptions:
( 3)

( 4)

Recklessly, or maliciously,

with criminal negligence
or is criminally negligent

with respect to circumstances
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surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of

is aware of but consciously disregards

a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it

its disregard

constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise
in

under

all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.
Section

Utah

76-5-201,

Code

Annotated,

different designations of homicide.

specified

Thereafter,

five

in the same

chapter, each designation is defined as to the act and intent
necessary to make it out.

The victim in each designation is no

less dead as a result of the described acts and intent that are
necessary to make out the offense.

The legislature has followed

an accepted pattern of treating defendants on the basis of the
types of acts committed in order to prescribe punishment.

The

acts are the products of the culpable mental state partially
described above.
forth

'

The presumption, with regard to the issue set

is that the offense of negligent homicide is not a lesser

included offense of manslaughter,
criminc:l negligence.

vis-a-vis recklessly and

with

Here the burden of proof does not lessen

because the elements are different.
It will be argued that one ough.!:_ to be aware of that which
he

is aware of,

but an examination of the most

significant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

differences in the subsections of the statute deal wit h " ... 1. t s
disreg2rd ... "

as

the

reckless

element

as

opposed

to

" ... the

failurs to perceive it ... " in the criminally negligent element;
the former being an active disregard of the risk,

the latter

being a passive oblivion regarding the risk.
State v.

How~~d,

597 P.2d 878, stands for the proposition

that negligent homicide is not a lesser included offense of the
charge of manslaughter.

Paragraph (3) of Section 76-1-402,

Utah

Criminal Code, provides as follows:
"A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in
the offense charged, but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so
included when:

"(a)
It is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
"(b)
It constitutes an attempt, solicitation,
conspirary or form of preparation to commit the offense
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
"(c)
It is specifically designated by a statute as
a lesser included offense."
Subparagraph (c)
Cr:.minal

Code

is

is not helpful in that nowhere in the Utah

negligent

homicide

specified

as

a

lesser

included offense of manslaughter.
Subpar2gr3ph (b) is also of no help in that the offense of
negligent homicide is not

En

inchoate offense.

It

is a

completed act and in no way can be considered an attempt, solicitation,

conspiracy or form of preparation for

·:.uah~er
S 1..,(;;
0
I.I

the crime of man-

•

5ubparagraph

(a)

needs to be considered

in

light of the

comparison given above; however, negligent hooicide in no way can
be considered

2

lesser included offense of

manslaug~ter
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under the

circumstances provided
1 of Section 76-5-205,
The

following

in subparagraphs (b)

and

(c)

to paragraph

Utah Criminal Code.

portion of respondent's (State of Utah) Brief

in the case of State vs. Boggess, (Case No.

---- -- ------

16232) is quoted in

support of defendant's position
"STATUTORY AND CASE LAW SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER OR SECOND DEGREE MURDER.
"The analysis in the respondent's initial Brief (P. 58) has been adopted by this Court in St2te v. Hendricks, 695
P.2d 633 (Utah, 1979) where this Court determined that
criminal trespass possessed intent elements which differed
from the alleged greater offense of burglary.
Thus, proof
of burglary does not 'necessarily include proof of all the
elements necessary to prove the lesser' crime of criminc:l
trespass, and in accordance with the standard established in
State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1 962)
criminal trespa-ss is not a lesser included offense of
burglary.
Similar to that case, in the present case the
alleged lesser included offense contains a mental element
which distinguishes it from the alleged greater offense of
manslaughter and second degree murder.
The crimes of second
degree murder and manslaughter contained a different element
of intent than that required for a conviction of negligent
homicide.
The difference, when read in light of the
Hendricks and Brennan, supra, line of cases, demonstrates
that-negligent homicide is not necessarily a lesser included
offense of manslaughter or second degree murder."
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
Criminal negligence is defined in Section 76-2-103 (4) as
follows:
"With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise i_n all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpo1nt.u
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The language of the statute seems to use a rel2tively large
number of words to state that criminal negligence is acting where
one ought. to be aware of a certain risk.

The types of risk that

may come within the definition of "certain risk" are uncertain.
Nevertheless,

it is important to remember that the applica-

tion is subjective, " ... as viewed from the actor's viewpoint."
[Section 76-2-103 (4), Utah Criminal Code].
The evidence presented by the State at trial is summarized
as follows:
(a)
defendant,
Robert

That during the period before the shooting,

in the presence of victim,

Dyer

(brother)

during

had been arguing with

which time defendant had

been

consuming intoxicating liquor.
(b)

That

upon

the

three

returr.ing

home

from

the

Forrest Inn, brother took the keys to defendant's car, thereby
prohibiting defendant from going elsewhere.
(c)

Victim went upstairs to brother's room and was not

heard from between that time and the time of the shooting.
(d)

That brother knew that defendant had been drinking

intoxicating liquor and continued to press the argument.
(e)

That brother struck defendant sever2l times, began

choking him, and then let him up when he felt shame for taking
advantage of defendant.
(f)

That defendant went straight to his bedroom and

had the rifle out when brother reached the doorway.
(g)

That defendant could not see the victim when the

rifle accidentally discharged.
(h)

That

the

discharge

of

the

rifle
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was

not

intentionc:l,

but was an accident.

(i)

That victim was struck in the face by a portion of

the projectile after it passed through the door jam, resulting in
her death.
There is no evidence before the Court that the defendant
loaded the rifle or knew that it was loaded.

The argument had

terminated

was accidentally

prior

discharged.

to

the

time

that

Defendant's contention

the

gun

is that

sufficient

proof is

necessary to sustain a conviction.
The

Court's

finding

was

that

" ... the

evidence

is

not

convincing that the defendant intentionally pulled the trigger on
the rifle ... "

CR.

355,

Line 8 -

10)

It seems that the Court's

judgment at that point may have been based upon other considerations, but that the quoted finding was the most obvious fact that
precluded a finding of guilty to the charge of manslaughter.

Had

the evidence convinced the Court that the trigger had been intention ally pulled in a careless act of frustration,
actor's standpoint"

issue

would

the "from the

have been seriously analyzed

in

order to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the charge of
manslaughter.
It is important to remember that the evidence was that the
gun was not pointed at anyone,

the gun was never used to threaten

anyone, and the gun was not part of the argument.

The argument

was over prior to the accidental shooting.
CONCLUSION
Defendant urges that the judge sitting alone can do nothing
which r.e would not be empowered to do with the aid of a jury.
2 iso

He

urges that the consideration by the trial judge in this case
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of a lesser

included offense without the express request of

defendant constitutes a violation of his sixth amendment right
not to be twice placed in jeopardy

for the same offense, as well

as an open participation by the judge in the prosecution of the
case.

For

these

reasons defendant

respectfully requests

a

reversal of his conviction.
Defendant urges that, under the present state of the law and
under the facts of this case, negligent homicide is not a lesser
and included offense of manslaughter.

For this reason defendant

requests that his conviction be reversed.
Defendant urges that the facts in this case do not support a
conviction to the charge of negligent homicide;

rather,

the

evidence supports a conclusion that the shooting was accidental not criminal.

Defendant requests that his conviction be

//-1

reversed.

rv~-tb day
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:_,R©-NALD . S ANGER L Attorney for Defendant

MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Mr.

D2vid N.

Wilkinson,

Building, Salt Lake City,

Attorney General,
Utah,

236 State Capitol

84114, this JS-f:L-.day of October,

1982.
•
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